South Carolina Journal of International Law and Business
Volume 18

Issue 1

Article 6

2021

CHINA'S MERGER REVIEW: THE REVIEW AGENCY IS IN BALANCE
WITH MAJOR STAKEHOLDERS
Huizhen Chen

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/scjilb
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Chen, Huizhen (2021) "CHINA'S MERGER REVIEW: THE REVIEW AGENCY IS IN BALANCE WITH MAJOR
STAKEHOLDERS," South Carolina Journal of International Law and Business: Vol. 18 : Iss. 1 , Article 6.
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/scjilb/vol18/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Journal of International Law and Business by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons.
For more information, please contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

CHINA'S MERGER REVIEW: THE REVIEW AGENCY IS IN BALANCE WITH MAJOR
STAKEHOLDERS 1
Huizhen Chen
ABSTRACT
China's relatively new merger review system continues trending toward those of the
United States and the European Union. However, its merger review will never entirely
converge with the Western model from either a competition policy or review methodology
perspective. Such divergence from the West, this article claims, is rooted in the decisionmaking mechanism of China's merger reviews. Traditionally, China's decision-making
mechanism has been viewed as a singular review-agency domination like that of the West. In
fact, however, China's merger reviews have issued remedies reflecting policies generated by
major stakeholders as well as the review agency. These co-decision-makers have balancing
relationships that forge an agency-stakeholder, rather than sole agency domination. Today,
China's State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR), established in 2018, follows a
path set by the earlier China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). This article provides
valuable insight into how the new active type of agency-stakeholder domination in China's
merger reviews balances both economic and non-economic (political) policies to protect
markets and consumers, as well as to be ready to react to the rise of protectionism globally.
INTRODUCTION
Since China has become one of the largest jurisdictions of merger reviews in the world, 2
it is beneficial to all potential participants to comprehensively understand its merger review.
The critical position of China in the global economy today ensures that its merger reviews can
significantly intervene in the business of many multinational companies. Therefore, to
understand the characteristics of China's merger reviews has both academic and practical value.
One striking difference with the West in China's merger reviews is that China heavily
relies on behavioral rather than structural remedies. From the perspective of economics,
structural remedies are more efficient to restore competition to pre-merger levels without
significant administrative costs. China's preference for behavioral remedies thus has usually
been considered as evidence of Chinese government intervention in the merger reviews and an
adoption of the government’s noneconomic or even political policies such as protection of
domestic competitors. 3 In Part I, this article first briefly introduces the traditional
understanding of China's merger reviews and their remedies, especially from the perspective
of comparison with the United States (US) and the European Union (EU).
In actual fact, however, the non-economic policies in China's merger reviews simply
reveal that China's merger review agency is not the only policy source. Although non-economic
policies are usually political policies representing the state interest, scholars have failed to
recognize the fact of multiple decision-makers inside China's merger reviews. This contrasts
with the singular review-agency domination in the US and the EU. In Part II, the article explains
1
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the Western singular review-agency domination.
Having had insufficient review officials, China's merger review agency could never be as
active as the Western counterparts. 4 With the significant increase of caseload in the past decade,
China's review agency has had to assign its review authority to other parties in order to
complete its reviews on time. Analyzing policy sources and remedy beneficiaries, Part III
reveals that major stakeholders may also at times generate non-economic policies in China's
merger reviews. These major stakeholders, such as merger parties or third-party acquirers,
actually became co-decision-makers with China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) in the
merger reviews. Therefore, the Chinese decision-making mechanism represents a unique
agency-stakeholder domination.
For instance, the 2014 Corun/Toyota China/PEVE/Sinogy/Toyota Tsusho (Toyota) and
2009 Panasonic/Sanyo (Panasonic) cases illustrate that the major stakeholder in both, Corun,
was, in fact, a second decision-maker. These cases involved the global nickel-metal hybrid
(NiMH) vehicle batteries market. Both of MOFCOM's decisions defined the product market
differently from the West and were therefore assumed to be subject to consistent political
policy. The truth is that, since MOFCOM could not fully analyze the market independently,
MOFCOM completed the merger reviews based on Corun's understanding of the product
market. This understanding, in fact, even went against China's relevant industrial policies, and
instead favored the stakeholder Corun. So Corun was an actual decision maker in both cases.
These cases refute the traditional assumption that MOFCOM alone dominated merger reviews.
By contrast, the remedies in both cases illustrate that MOFCOM shared its review authority
with Corun in the decision-making mechanism.
MOFCOM's hold-separate remedies in the 2011 Seagate/Samsung (Seagate) and the 2012
Western Digital/Viviti (Western Digital) cases also illustrate MOFCOM's distinction from its
Western counterparts in its balancing with the merger parties. Compared to the West's use of
hold-separate remedies only to support primary structural remedies, 5 MOFCOM's holdseparate remedies tend to be temporary structural remedies in a behavioral remedy format. In
both cases, MOFCOM gave up structural remedies because it could not further divide the
product market and had to accept Seagate's product market analysis. MOFCOM relied on nonneutral analysis from the merger parties again because of its insufficient review capacity. Thus,
MOFCOM's remedies contained both behavioral and structural remedy characteristics.
Therefore, in both groups of cases MOFCOM shared its review authority with major
stakeholders, such as merger parties or third party acquirers, which represents a unique agencystakeholder domination.
The merger reviews of MOFCOM’s successor, China's State Administration for Market
Regulation (SAMR) continue to represent China's agency-stakeholder domination. In 2018, in
a government effort to unify its competition law enforcement jurisdiction, SAMR officially
replaced MOFCOM to become the new merger review agency. Since then, SAMR has
systematically reformed China's merger review from multiple levels to efficiently protect
markets and consumers. Because the merger review officials working for MOFCOM all

See Fei Deng, Roundtable on Antitrust Developments in China Ten Years On, 18 ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 2 (2018)
[hereinafter Roundtable].
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See Eric Emch, Thomas D. Jeitschko &Arthur Zhou, What Past Agency Actions Say About Complexity in Merger
Remedies, with an Application to Generic Drug Divestitures, 27 COMPETITION: J. ANTI., UCL & PRIVACY SEC.
CAL. L. ASSOC. 87, 91 (2018).
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transferred to SAMR, 6 SAMR has largely maintained MOFCOM's agency-stakeholder
domination, and major stakeholders may still influence merger reviews far beyond their limited
role in the West as "information sources."
China's decision-making mechanism of merger reviews, however, has faced new
challenges since the establishment of SAMR. Accompanied by the rise of protectionism, the
trade war between the US and China threatens the supply of essential upstream products to
China in critical industries. Part IV thus reveals that as with MOFCOM, SAMR's merger
reviews continue to have stakeholders with equivalent weight to the review agency.
Nevertheless, the active agency role is stronger under SAMR, as major stakeholders cannot
affect the decision-making mechanism to issue merger review remedies that would damage
state interests or industrial policies as they could in the agency-stakeholder domination during
MOFCOM's time.
Thus, SAMR demonstrates in the 2020 ZF/Wabco (ZF) case a new active type of
balancing relationship between decision-makers. Merger parties ZF and Wabco are
manufacturers of commercial vehicle components. In its decision, SAMR pays abnormal
attention to Shaanxi Fast, a leading Chinese competitor of the AMT system. In the ZF case,
Shaanxi Fast appears to have nonetheless significantly influenced the decision-making
mechanism, as a third-party competitor to ZF. The remedies moreover primarily benefit
Shaanxi Fast, implying major stakeholders still play important roles in SAMR's decisionmaking mechanism. This shows how SAMR actively intervenes in business operations of
merger parties, demonstrating this unique type of agency-stakeholder domination.
In sum, unlike the West's singular review-agency domination with clear policy
preferences, China's merger review designs remedy structure to reflect the competition policies
of the agency and the decision-makers simultaneously. Therefore, one fundamental
characteristic of China's merger reviews, different from those of the West, is that China and
major stakeholders are balanced in the agency-stakeholder domination, indicating equivalent
weight among competition policies.
I.

CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINA’S MERGER REVIEWS

The characteristics of China's merger reviews can be clearly seen by comparison with the
US and the EU The traditional approach to the features of China's merger reviews is to focus
on laws, procedures, and practices. This approach usually reaches a split recognition of China's
merger reviews: on the one hand, its review methods significantly converge towards the West;
on the other hand, its review remedies stick to behavioral instead of structural ones.
Traditionally, China's over-application of behavioral remedies has been considered as overemphasizing political policies in the merger reviews. However, this interpretation, in fact,
ignores deeper distinctions from the West in the decision-making mechanism.
A. CHINA’S MERGER REVIEW PRACTICES CONVERGE TOWARDS THE WEST
Compared to their counterparts in the US and the EU, China's merger reviews are known
for their unique characteristics. Both the former MOFCOM and the current SAMR often issue
different remedies from those of their Western counterparts. 7 Generally, both the US and the
EU prefer issuing structural remedies to diminish significant anti-competitive effects of

6

See Deng & Huang, supra note 2, at 18; see also Roundtable, supra note 3.
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mergers. 8 By contrast, China primarily depends on behavioral remedies. 9 The context of a
decision would show only a blunt conclusion without explanation of relevant markets and
competition effects. 10
With the growing demand for detailed analyses, the context of China's merger reviews
has become gradually enlarged, containing six sections: case-filing and review procedure,
general case information, relevant markets, competitive analysis, discussion with additional
restrictive conditions, and final remedy orders. 11 The addition of relevant markets and
competitive analysis sections demonstrates how China's merger review agency is enhancing
efficiency analysis by applying a law and economics approach.
China's merger review agency has adopted a law and economics approach similar to its
Western counterparts. From the perspective of methodologies, MOFCOM absorbed the
Chicago School theory of economics: it transitioned from unilateral counting on market
structures by primarily monitoring the combined market shares and concentration levels after
mergers, to considering efficiency defenses when analyzing potential anti-competitive
effects. 12 Generally, China's merger reviews have developed analytical capacities, regulation
transparency, and decision predictability.
In practice, China's merger review agency hires legal and economics experts to enhance
its analytical capacity. To provide further credence to its merger reviews, China has established
a consultant team consisting of legal, technological, and economics experts to analyze post8
See Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Keynote Address at American Bar
Association's
Antitrust
Fall
Forum, U.S. Dept.
of
Justice
(Nov.
16,
2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-makan-delrahim-delivers-keynote-addressamerican-bar [https://perma.cc/6Q3X-N4CV] [hereinafter Delrahim 11.16.2017]; see also Emch, Jeitschko &
Zhou, supra note 4, at 88; see also Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under Council Regulation (EC)
No 139/2004 and under Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004, 2008 O.J. (C 267) 1, ¶15 (EC), https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52008XC1022(01)&from=EN [https://perma.cc/RC6M8G6D].
9

See Deng & Huang, supra note 2, at 9.

For example, in the 2009 Pfizer/Wyeth case, MOFCOM only emphasized the governing law without any further
in-depth argument on how to determine the relevant markets or market powers of merger parties. See Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Shangwubu Gonggao 2009 Di 77 Hao Guanyu Futiaojian Pizhun Huirui Gongsi Shougou
Huishi Gongsi Fanlongduan Shencha Jueding De Gonggao [Notice [2009] No. 77 of MOFCOM of the P.R.C.]
(中华人民共和国商务部公告[2009]第77号
关于附条件批准辉瑞公司收购惠氏公司反垄断审查决定的公告) [Announcement No.77 [2009] of the
Ministry of Commerce-Announcement on Decisions from Anti-monopoly Review of the Concentration of
Undertakings on Conditional Approval of Proposed Merger between Pfizer and Wyeth] (issued by MOFCOM,
Sep. 29, 2009, effective the same day), http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/200909/20090906541443.shtml
[https://perma.cc/7KGM-FNDX] (China).
11
Use the 2017 Becton Dickinson/Bard case as an example. All later decisions issued by MOFCOM have similar
structures. See Shangwubu Gonggao 2017 Di 92 Hao Guanyu Fujia Xianzhixing Tiaojian Pizhun Beikedun
Dijincen Gongsi Yu Meiguo Bade Gongsi Hebing'an Jingyingzhe Jizhong Fanlongduan Shencha Jueding De
Gonggao
(商务部公告2017年第92号
关于附加限制性条件批准贝克顿迪金森公司与美国巴德公司合并案经营者集中反垄断审查决定的公告)
[Ministry
of
Commerce—
Announcement on Decision from Anti-Monopoly Review of the merger of Undertakings on Conditional Approval
of Proposed Merger between Becton, Dickinson and Company and C. R. Bard, Inc.] (issued by MOFCOM, Dec.
27, 2017, effective the same day), http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/201712/20171202691390.shtml
[https://perma.cc/UA8S-HG6Y] (China).
12
See Fei Deng & Yizhe Zhang, Interview with Shang Ming, Director General of the Anti-Monopoly Bureau
Under the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, 13 ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 2 (2014).
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merger competitive effects of merger reviews. 13 These experts are not permanent merger
review officials, but outside consultants working primarily in their respective fields. 14 Their
main tasks are to draft reports on competition regulations and related guidelines, assess market
competition, provide advice in high-profile cases, and present introductory information on
domestic and international hot topics in competition law. 15
Thus, most distinctions of review techniques from the West are only temporary flaws
reflecting China's insufficient review capacity. China, as a developing country, frequently
reforms competition law practices to meet the needs of the rapidly developing economy. 16
Many substantive and procedural differences in merger review practices have been revised in
the later reform of merger review regulations. 17 Competition policies in merger reviews can
generally be divided into two categories: economic and non-economic (political). 18 All
economic policies derive from the purpose of either promoting market efficiency or consumer
welfare. Non-economic (political) policies, on the other hand, cover all the other policies not
included in economic policies. 19 Thus, the scope of competition policies may be infinite,
depending on the identity of potential competition policy sources and economic development
in their jurisdictions.20 For economic policies, utility can objectively be measured by law and
economics theories. 21 For instance, the concept of promoting consumer welfare can be
expressed graphically as maximizing consumer surplus. Market efficiency can be described as
maximizing the total of both consumer and producer surplus, or as the difference of production
According to the news article online, the first expert consulting group was established in December 2011. The
group directly worked for the Antitrust Committee of the State Council. There were 21 experts, including scholars
and professors from Shanghai Jiaotong University, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Renmin
University of China, Peking University, China University of Political Science and Law, and other famous
universities. There were also some experts from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and related government
ministries and commissions. Most of the experts were legal experts, and others were economists and technical
experts. See Shi Dongdong (是冬冬), Zhang Xinzhu Huiying Bei Guowuyuan Fanlongduan Weiyuanhui
Zhuanjiazu
Jiepin:
Wo
Bang
Waiqi
Shuohua
Le
(张昕竹回应被国务院反垄断委员会专家组解聘：我帮外企说话了) [stating Mr. Zhang Xinzhu’s response to
be fired by the Anti-Monopoly Committee of the State Council: "I spoke for foreign companies”], PAPER (澎湃)
(Aug. 12, 2014), [https://perma.cc/H3XD-RRYJ] (China).https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1261301
[https://perma.cc/H3XD-RRYJ] (China).
13

14

See id.

15

Id. The process of experts' consultation and its actual influences on review still remains opaque.

16

See Roundtable, supra note 3, at 12.

For instance, MOFCOM initially did not adopt the rules of crown jewels in its structural remedies. Yet, in just
a few years, MOFCOM adopted this type of alternative divestiture commitments in practice and officially
published guidelines on them. These static differences in merger review methods may overemphasize the actual
gap that exists between China and the West. See Ye Jun (叶军), Jingyingzhe Jizhong Fanlongduan Shencha Zhi
Huangguan Baoshi Guize Yanjiu (经营者集中反垄断审查之皇冠宝石规则研究) [Study on the Rules of Crown
Jewels in Merger Reviews], 28 ZHONGWAI FAXUE (中外法学) [Peking Univ. L. J.], No. 4, 1057 (2016) (China).
17

18
See Dina I. Waked, Antitrust Goals in Developing Countries: Policy Alternatives and Normative Choices, 38
SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 945, 951 (2015).

For instance, in Williamson's welfare trade-off model, no surplus triangle or rectangle can positively correspond
to political policy.

19

See D. Daniel Sokol, Tensions Between Antitrust and Industrial Policy, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1247, 1248
(2015).
20

There are some debates over whether these competition policies can be measured from the perspective of
economics theories. For instance, the concept of "allocative efficiency" or "total surplus" may not truly reflect all
aspects of "consumer welfare" in the moral philosophy sense.
21
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cost compared to the allocative benefits. 22 In economic graphs, such surpluses or benefits
appear as surplus triangles (such as consumer surplus) and rectangles (such as producer
benefit). Therefore, economic policies can lead different review agencies to similar conclusions
when market structures are identical.
By contrast, non-economic (political) policies do not correspond to economic models. No
surplus triangle or rectangle can positively correspond to political policy because political
policies usually cannot be deconstructed into a price-quantity two-dimensional graph. In fact,
the consequential effects of non-economic policies may be beyond the scope of measurement.
For instance, one competition policy which cannot be quantified in the EU's competition law
is the integration of a common European market. 23 Apparently, the analytical method of such
a policy is flexible without any objective guidance. 24 Therefore, arguments relating to political
policies are usually presented in a descriptive rather than mathematical format to analyze the
potentially adverse effects on competition.
Since merger review agencies prepare remedies to achieve certain goals, both economic
and non-economic (political), the remedies inevitably reflect the competition policies adopted
in merger reviews. Thus, just as competition policies can be categorized into economic and
non-economic (political) policies, there are two basic types of remedies when the review
agencies conditionally clear transactions. Structural remedies are to fully divest a company's
related assets or business departments to an unrelated third-party. 25 Behavioral remedies act
something like injunctions, restricting merger parties from certain business activities or
requiring them to take certain action to preserve competition. 26
The classification of remedies in merger reviews is consistent with the types of
competition policies. For instance, the US and the EU generally consider structural remedies as
the most efficient remedies. 27 In practice, the West recognizes the adverse effects of
administrative intervention in the regime of commerce. 28 It also confirms the long-range
damage of the over-application of behavioral remedies to consumers and competition. 29 The
Western fundamental business philosophy is that a businessman knows the market better than
See Daniel J. Gifford & Robert T. Kudrle, Rhetoric and Reality in the Merger Standards of the United States,
Canada, and the European Union, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 423, 427-28 (2005).

22

23

See Sokol, supra note 19, at 1256.

See Marcin Szczepańsk, EU competition policy: Key to a fair single market, 2 EUR. PARLIAMENTARY RES.
SERV.,
Oct.
2019,
at
30,
n.
63,
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2019/642209/EPRS_IDA(2019)642209_EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MW2N-GXNG].
24

25

See Emch, Jeitschko & Zhou, supra note 4.

The typical behavioral remedies include “compulsory licensing, line-of-business restrictions, prohibitions on
product integration, disclosure of the application programming interfaces (‘APIs’), and limitations on contractual
terms with customers.” See Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network Indus., 68
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6 (2001); see also Per Hellström, Frank Maier-Rigaud & Friedrich Wenzel Bulst, Remedies in
European Antitrust Law, 76 ANTITRUST L. J. 43, 47 (2009).
26

See Jillian Bray, Firmly Grasping the Knife: An Investigation of the Asymmetric Application of Chinese Antitrust
Law as a Protectionist Tool, 24 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 351, 378 (2016) (claiming the FTC and DOJ issued
more decisions with structural remedies and the outcomes of structural remedies are more efficient in maintaining
the competition); see also Greg Olsen, Revised EU Merger Remedy Guidance, 23 ANTITRUST, Summer 2009, at
80, 82 (stating the Notice of EC shows a clear preference for divestiture remedy over other forms of remedy).
27

28

See Ken Heyer, Optimal Remedies for Anticompetitive Mergers, 26 ANTITRUST, Spring 2012, at 26.

29

Id.
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any official. 30 Thus, the best remedies for the West are those that do not distort market
competition by merger review officials. Structural remedies only require divesting particular
businesses or assets to avoid direct regulation of merger parties or the need to appoint a
monitoring trustee. 31 Thus, structural remedies are generally most appropriate for promoting
economic policies in merger reviews.
B. CHINA’S UNIQUE RELIANCE ON BEHAVIORAL REMEDIES
China's behavioral remedies, unlike Western behavioral remedies, do not generally
support primary structural remedies, but are instead independent. China's merger review
agency, in fact, has multiple types of behavioral remedies. 32 MOFCOM and its successor,
SAMR, have never considered that only structural remedies could reduce mergers’ potential
anticompetitive effects. On the contrary, China's practices strongly indicate that China
considers restrictions on business operations to be equally as effective as permanent
divestitures.
For instance, China's hold-separate remedies are unique among all three jurisdictions. 33
By "hold-separate" it is meant that, after a merger, the merger review agency requires the
merger parties to operate temporarily as independent entities. However, China’s hold-separate
remedies usually last for a few years; their effects are similar to divesting certain assets or
business packages instead of just transitional regulations during the period of divestiture. 34
Behavioral remedies offer China's merger review agency an opportunity to continually
regulate the business operations of combined companies for years after the merger. According
to China's Anti-Monopoly Law, 35 China never hesitated to adopt an expansive scope of
political policies, 36 and political policies are not inferior to economic ones in China's merger
reviews. 37 Westerners have believed that China's principal reliance on behavioral remedies
proves that the Chinese government intends to use its merger reviews as a vehicle for industrial
policies promoted by the Chinese Communist Party. 38
See Harlan M. Blake & William K. Jones, Toward A Three-Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV.
422 (1965).
30

31
See Emch, Jeitschko & Zhou, supra note 4, at 88; see also Cunzhen Huang & Fei Deng, Convergence with
Chinese Characteristics? A Cross-Jurisdictional Comparative Study of Recent Merger Enforcement in China, 31
ANTITRUST, Spring 2017, at 44, 48.

In practice, China often requires merger parties to serve customers fairly; not restrict customers' selection of
other suppliers; terminate certain strategic corporation agreements with other main competitors; maintain the
service and production capacities at a certain level; prevent further merger or acquisition of main competitors;
establish an information firewall; restrict anticompetitive conduct such as false advertising, bundling, and tying;
and make FRAND commitments on the Standard Essential Patents (SEPs).
32

33
The Western hold-separate remedies are intended to support the success of the divestitures and usually last for
less than half a year. MOFCOM, by contrast, adopted its own type of long-term order in many horizontal mergers.
34

See Deng & Huang, supra note 2, at 12-13.

See Fanlongduan Fa (反垄断法) [Anti-Monopoly Law], ch. 1, art. 1 (2007) (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008) (China) [hereinafter Anti-Monopoly Law].
36
See Yane Svetiev & Lei Wang, Competition Law Enforcement in China: Between Technocracy and Industrial
Policy, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2016, at 187, 191.
35

37

Id.

The fundamental technique of structural remedies is as simple as selling a well-segregated subsidiary, product
line, or asset to a suitable third-party sustaining divested business activity competitively. Therefore, structural
remedies often have limited room for political consideration. For the West, the fewer applications of structural
remedies imply that China's remedies were subject to political factors.
38
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Since China has not issued thorough guidelines on merger reviews, traditional literature
on the subject tends to use an "outside-in" approach to analyze the competition policies adopted
in MOFCOM's merger reviews. By outside-in, the author means interpreting policy preferences
from the external beneficiaries of the remedies. But this approach ignores the fact that a remedy
provision may contain multiple remedy beneficiaries. Some beneficiaries only receive benefits
passively or collaterally from merger remedies.
In sum, the author believes that competition policy sources, rather than remedy
beneficiaries, determine the competition policy represented in a remedy. 39 A decision-maker
in a merger review must be a beneficiary, either direct or indirect. A beneficiary, however, may
not always be a decision-maker. In other words, although the Chinese government may be an
external beneficiary of behavioral remedies, it is at least problematic to consider China's merger
review agency as the sole competition policy source in MOFCOM's (or SAMR's) merger
reviews. There may be other sources and other beneficiaries.
II.

SINGULAR REVIEW- AGENCY DOMINATIONS: US AND EU

Investigation into the decision-making mechanism of merger reviews reveals the true
identity of the competition policy sources. The "decision-making mechanism" is a system
indicating how an agency reviews mergers. Generally, the decision-making mechanism
demonstrates the flexible interactions among decision-makers on a case-by-case basis. 40 The
policy preferences of decision-makers influence the determinations of remedies. Thus, like two
sides of a coin, the competition policy sources in merger reviews are also the decision-makers
in the decision-making mechanism.
The decision-making mechanism of China's merger reviews is different from that of the
West. Both the US and the EU have literally hundreds of officials with legal and economic
backgrounds working for their merger review agencies, while MOFCOM usually had only
around thirty officials. Considering the significant increase in China's merger review caseload
in recent years, the improvement in administrative efficiency of China's merger review agency
cannot fully explain why China's merger reviews still operate functionally. The author asserts
that China's merger review agency consistently shares its merger review authority with
stakeholders, thus forging a different type of decision-making mechanism compared to its
Western counterparts.
In the US and the EU, the merger review agencies themselves are the sole decision-makers
dominating their decision-making mechanisms. A merger review agency has legitimate
authority to review mergers in order to reduce their potential anti-competitive effects. Thus,
the most common decision-maker is the merger review agency. 41 By contrast, all stakeholders
of Western merger reviews, such as merger parties, downstream or upstream manufacturers,
and competitors, function only as market information sources. Thus, the US and the EU
demonstrate review-agency domination in their decision-making mechanisms.
39
For instance, a simple remedy like a divestiture, from the state perspective, may represent an economic policy.
By contrast, for a competitor, the remedy may demonstrate political considerations.

Every interested party has an incentive to influence the decision-making mechanism. Some parties would
acquire enough power to dominate the decision-making mechanism when to determine the analytical approaches
and remedy structures, becoming decision-makers in the process. The rest would simply become information
sources for merger reviews.
40

The potential decision-makers include a merger review agency and some major stakeholders. Contrasting to
major stakeholders, such as a merger party or competitor, only the merger review agency consistently qualified
as a decision-maker in the decision-making mechanism.
41
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There are several reasons for the US and the EU's singular review-agency domination
paradigm. First, the sheer size of these agencies ensures their capacity to dominate reviews. In
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the European Commission (EC), there are hundreds
of legal and economics professionals conducting independent research on merger review
remedies and supervising their implementation. These review officials have published detailed
merger review guidelines with comprehensive summaries of applicable review methods and
principles. 42 Further, the officials have established a comprehensive information collection and
verification system. They amass market data from previous review practices needed to
maintain independent merger reviews. These highly efficient professionals ensure that the
singular dominance of merger review agencies runs smoothly in both jurisdictions.
Moreover, the US and the EU intentionally enhance their review agency's domination in
their merger reviews. Both jurisdictions will select the most appropriate agency for a merger
review. In the US, for example, where the FTC and the Department of Justice (DOJ) share
review authority over mergers, cases will be assigned on a case-by-case basis, depending on
which agency has more expertise with the industry involved. 43 The EU similarly authorizes
the EC to review mergers that are likely to have no significant inter-state effects. 44
Accordingly, this agency-selection process allows Western merger review agencies to enhance
the review-agency domination in both jurisdictions.
The consistent competition policy preferences in Western merger reviews confirm this
singular review agency domination. A merger review agency is generally the only party in the
decision-making mechanism with a consistent policy preference, namely to diminish the
potential anti-competitive effects of mergers or to protect domestic industries to ensure
economic development. The consideration of economic policies, such as market efficiency and
consumer welfare, require the agency to maintain neutrality since those economic policies
benefit society in general, not only a specific privileged group. Meanwhile, although the
agencies may occasionally promote political policies to ensure economic development, such
promotion will usually favor a specific industry instead of an individual company. Over time,
such protections repeatedly apply without consideration of the identities of the merger parties.
Therefore, a merger review agency generally maintains stable policy preferences, while merger
parties may change from case to case.
By contrast, major stakeholders may have flexible policy preferences, based on the current
market situation and their relationship to the review agency. 45 For instance, a multinational
company may file a pre-merger notification, then, as a merger party, raise arguments or defense
about the efficiency policy at stake. However, when the same company becomes a competitor
with other merger parties in another case, it may argue that protecting the competitor promotes
See U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmg.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZGJ-W9YY]; see also Off. J. of the Eur.
Union, Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers Under the Council Regulation on the Control of
Concentrations
Between
Undertakings,
5
(Feb.
5,
2004),
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52004XC0205(02)&from=EN.

42

See Fed. Trade Comm'n, Premerger Notification and the Merger Review Process, https://www.ftc.gov/tipsadvice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/mergers/premerger-notification-merger-review
[https://perma.cc/XD9J-S7K5] (last visited Feb. 12, 2020).
43

The EC assumes responsibility for the case from member states when the Commission can more efficiently
perform the review.
44

For instance, the competitors to merger parties may raise concerns about maintaining the market structure to
promote competition. If, in another merger, the competitors become merger parties they will adopt the efficiency
defense argument for the success of the merger.
45
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consumer welfare. Thus, even when the same stakeholders are involved in different proposed
mergers, their policy preferences may vary according to their different positions in the merger.
In sum, Western merger reviews present only their merger review agencies as singular
decision-makers that create consistent policy preferences. The interests of major stakeholders
are subject to the dominating influence of merger review agencies. Large companies thus have
an incentive to lobby the supervising agencies to receive non-economic advantages in market
competition. With enhanced information collection and economic analysis systems, the
Western merger review agencies can resist major shareholders' influences by verifying the
documents and arguments they offer. If the prospective stakeholder's non-economic
considerations conflict with the agency's policy preference, the agency will refuse to intervene
in the transaction. Thus, the role of major stakeholders in the Western jurisdictions is only that
of information source and not decision-maker in a merger review.
III.

MOFCOM AND AGENCY- STAKEHOLDER DOMINATION

China's decision-making mechanisms contain distinctive features, like a home-made
quilt, precisely because of inadequacies in the merger review agency. China lacks significant
analytical capacity by comparison with the two other major merger review jurisdictions. Such
inadequacy in merger reviews can be attributed to a simple fact: MOFCOM's merger review
staff stabilized at just around 30 officials. 46 Although the efficiency of MOFCOM's merger
reviews has increased by more than 85 percent over the past ten years, 47 MOFCOM's workload
has increased about five times since the agency started to review mergers. 48 The rate of
efficiency increase is thus far disproportionate to the overwhelmingly increased workload. In
order to complete the reviews on time, MOFCOM had to share its review authority with other
parties. The result, in contrast with the West, was that stakeholders in MOFCOM's merger
reviews actually became co-decision-makers, thus creating a multiparty decision-making
mechanism.
A. MOFCOM SHARED ITS REVIEW AUTHORITIES WITH MAJOR STAKEHOLDERS
There is only limited scholarship on China's competition policies and the decision-making
mechanism inside their mergers. These scholars are aware that China's merger reviews often
involve noneconomic (political) policies, and that China's merger review agency is not always
the only decision maker in merger reviews because of China's administrative structure. 49
However, most of the literature concerns only the visible interagency relationships inside the

Deng & Huang, supra note 2, at 1; see also Angela Huyue Zhang, Taming the Chinese Leviathan: Is Antitrust
Regulation a False Hope?, 51 STAN. J. INT'L L. 195, 215 (2015).

46

See Interview with Wu Zhenguo, Director General of China's State Administration for Market Regulation
(SAMR), 18 ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 5 (2018).
47

See Deng & Huang, supra note 2, at 1; see also D. Daniel Sokol, Merger Control Under China's Anti-Monopoly
Law, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1, 33 (2013).
48

49
See Yuni Yan Sobel, Domestic-to-Domestic Transactions-A Gap in China's Merger Control Regime?, 13
ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 9 (2014).
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Chinese government. 50 In other words, noneconomic (political) policies are believed to be
generated by the state alone. In the current literature, no one has yet analyzed whether major
stakeholders, such as merger parties or principal third-party competitors, have become decision
makers in China's merger reviews. Competition policies in China's merger reviews may reflect
not just state interests, but the private interests of major stakeholders as well.
MOFCOM's merger review agency, in fact, has demonstrated great reliance on market
information offered by major stakeholders to complete its reviews. MOFCOM even required
merger parties to recommend essential information such as market definition, and to determine
whether any competition issue might exist.51 In fact, merger parties were occasionally required
to consider the potential impact of their proposed merger on the local Chinese industry or
China's national economy with a stringent burden of proof, tasks beyond their traditional duty
as mere information sources. 52 Moreover, MOFCOM often consulted with trade associations,
major competitors, customers and suppliers, and sometimes even independent third-party
economics experts. 53 These major stakeholders carried significantly more weight
in MOFCOM's merger reviews than do their counterparts in the West, and they are much more
political. 54 MOFCOM's merger reviews thus presented agency-stakeholder domination in the
decision-making mechanism.
To delve into MOFCOM's agency-stakeholder domination, this Part will study a group of
decisions with identical markets or stakeholders involved in more than one decision. Since the
agency-stakeholder domination contains multiple decision makers, MOFCOM's review
remedies in response benefited many parties. Thus, a single decision might not identify the true
decision makers since one case cannot control all effective variables when analyzing the
beneficiaries of the remedies. However, a group of decisions involving identical markets or
stakeholders can offset some variables in the analysis. The distinctive features of MOFCOM's
decision-making mechanism are thus better demonstrated in the following group of decisions
involving some identical markets or stakeholders.
B. DOMESTIC STAKEHOLDER AS DECISION- MAKER: TOYOTA AND PANASONIC
Both the Toyota case and the Panasonic case demonstrate an identical understanding of
the product market, indicating that the same decision maker, the major stakeholder, likely
determined both final orders. In fact, the common understanding of the product market proved
identical to that of the major stakeholder, Corun, and the remedies all directly or indirectly
benefited Corun. Additionally, the political policy common to the above cases was to promote
the development of NiMH vehicle batteries in order to benefit the domestic hybrid vehicle
market. This policy is, in fact, against China's national industrial policy in the auto industry. In
MOFCOM often consults with other Chinese agencies, and usually shares its merger review authority with other
administrative agencies. For instance, a merger involving State-owned Enterprises required approval from the
State Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, and the National Development and Reform
Commission. These agencies worked alongside MOFCOM in merger reviews instead of being mere information
sources of concerned markets. See Angela Huyue Zhang, Bureaucratic Politics and China's Anti-Monopoly Law,
47 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 671, 675 (2014); see also Gregory K. Leonard & Yizhe Zhang, Considering the Unique
Aspects of the Merger Review Process in China, 14 ANTITRUST SOURCE 1 (2014); Sokol, supra note 47, at 29-30;
Svetiev & Wang, supra note 35, at 199-203.
50

See Peter Wang, Yizhe Zhang & Sébastien Evrard, China Merger Review: a New Gauntlet for Global M&A,
THE M&A LAW, 2011, at 1.

51

52

See Leonard & Zhang, supra note 49, at 2.

53

Id. at 1; see also Foster, supra note 1, at 81; see also Svetiev & Wang, supra note 35, at 209.

54

See Sokol, supra note 47, at 20; see also Svetiev & Wang, supra note 35, at 207.

VOL. 18.1

SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS

12

sum, Corun, a major stakeholder in both cases, was clearly the actual decision maker
influencing the remedy determination of China's national review agency, MOFCOM.
In the Toyota case, MOFCOM issued behavioral remedies, including one "defensive" one
to the merger party, Corun. Toyota China, Primearth EV Energy (PEVE), Changshu Sinogy,
and Toyota Tsusho joined to establish a domestic joint venture called Corun PEVE in Jiangsu
Province, China, to produce the NiMH vehicle battery system. Corun PEVE adopted PEVE's
related technologies to produce battery modules of NiMH vehicle batteries primarily supplying
Sinogy Toyota. Ultimately, MOFCOM ordered the joint venture to distribute its products to
third parties following the principle of "Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory" (FRAND).
The joint venture was to go on sale within three years after production to correspond to market
demand. 55
In the Panasonic case, MOFCOM issued structural rather than behavioral remedies to
diminish potential anticompetitive effects, but the internal decision maker was still the common
major stakeholder, Corun, although here Corun was a third-party purchaser of the divested
package. Both Sanyo and Panasonic are international companies with a wide range of
electronic components and device businesses, including batteries and industrial products.
MOFCOM ordered Sanyo to divest its rechargeable coin shape lithium battery business in
Tottori, Japan. Additionally, MOFCOM required the merger parties to divest either Panasonic's
or Sanyo's civil use NiMH battery business. Finally, MOFCOM required Panasonic to divest
its NiMH vehicle battery business in Kanagawa, Japan, and reduce Panasonic's shares from the
then current 40% to 19.5% in PEVE. 56 This divestiture was purchased by Corun.
Both of the above mergers clearly involved the NiMH vehicle battery industry. In Toyota,
a joint venture was formed: Corun PEVE, Corun and PEVE being both manufacturers of NiMH
batteries. Similarly, in Panasonic, Panasonic and Sanyo overlapped in NiMH battery
production, especially vehicle batteries. Furthermore, Toyota and Panasonic were the owners
of PEVE. Toyota was the world's leading hybrid vehicle manufacturer and the downstream
purchaser of NiMH batteries. 57 The two transactions, therefore, contain both horizontal and
vertical merger effects regarding NiMH batteries.
See Shangwubu Gonggao 2014 Nian Di 49 Hao Guanyu Fujia Xianzhixing Tiaojian Pizhun Keliyuan Fengtian
Zhongguo PEVE Xinzhongyuan Fengtian Tongshang Ni Sheli Heying Qiye An Jingyingzhe Jizhong Fanlongduan
Shencha
Jueding
De
Gonggao
(商务部公告2014年第49号—
关于附加限制性条件批准科力远、丰田中国、PEVE、新中源、丰田通商拟设立合营企业案经营者集中
反垄断审查决定的公告) [Announcement No. 49 [2014] of the Ministry of Commerce—Announcement on the
Decision from Anti-Monopoly Review of the Concentration of Undertakings on Conditional Approval of the
Establishment of Joint Venture by Hunan Corun New Energy Co., Ltd., Toyota (China) Co., Ltd., Primearth EV
Energy Co., Ltd., Changshu Sinogy Venture Capital Co. Ltd., and Toyota Tsusho Corp.] (issued by MOFCOM,
Jul. 2, 2014, effective the same day), http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/201407/20140700648291.shtml
[https://perma.cc/57NB-LQXF] (China) [hereinafter Toyota Case].
56
See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shangwubu Gonggao 2009 Nian Di 82 Hao Guanyu Futiaojian Pizhun
Songxia Gongsi Shougou Sanyang Gongsi Fanlongduan Shencha Jueding De Gonggao
(中华人民共和国商务部[2009年]第82号公告关于附条件批准松下公司收购三洋公司反垄断审查决定的公
告 ) [Announcement No. 82 [2009] of the Ministry of Commerce]—Announcement on the Decision from AntiMonopoly Review of the Concentration of Undertakings on Conditional Approval of Sanyo Electric Co., Ltd. by
Panasonic Co., Ltd.] (issued by MOFCOM, Oct. 30, 2009, effective the same day),
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/200910/20091006593175.shtml
[https://perma.cc/K7DM-PD8R]
(China)
[hereinafter Panasonic Case].
57
Toyota itself owns 80.5% of the PEVE's shares. Panasonic, another leading batteries manufacturer, owns 19.5%
of shares.
55
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From the consistently narrow scope of the product market, both merger reviews were
subject to the same noneconomic (political) policy. In both cases, MOFCOM claimed to define
NiMH batteries as an independent product market. 58 However, in the FTC's Panasonic/Sanyo
case, the FTC concluded that the Li-ion hybrid vehicle (HEV) batteries were a superior
alternative to NiMH batteries, so the product market should also include Li-ion batteries. 59
Many companies were already supplying Li-ion HEV batteries to vehicle manufacturers. 60
Since the geographic market for NiMH batteries is global, the product market scope should be
the same in both China and the US if MOFCOM had been considering only economic policies.
The consistently narrow range of the product market in these two cases further implies that
both of MOFCOM's decisions were subject to an identical noneconomic (political) policy.
MOFCOM's additional structural remedies in the Panasonic case appear to reflect a
political policy representing state interest. In Panasonic, the FTC only ordered Sanyo to divest
one portable HEV NiMH battery manufacturing plant in Takasaki, Japan, 61 because the FTC
considered that the merger did not raise competitive concerns in the HEV battery market. 62.
Whereas MOFCOM added a second structural remedy divesting a Panasonic HEV plant in
Chigasaki, Kanagawa, Japan. 63 The additional divestiture indeed weakened the productivity of
the newly merged company, contributing to the false impression of China's review-agency
domination to promote state political policies. It appeared that the remedies were promoting
Chinese industrial policy by blocking foreign development, but in fact, the stakeholder, Corun,
was a third-party acquirer of Panasonic's Chigasaki plant. 64 So, the remedy primarily benefited
the stakeholder, Corun, rather than the Chinese government.
The policies represented by MOFCOM's remedies in these two cases actually conflicted
with China's state interest in the new energy automobile industry. Under Chinese policy, the
battery industry had focused on improving energy density, and the Chinese auto industry was
actually promoting the application of Li-ion batteries. 65 In fact, the future of the auto industry
in China was never in hybrid vehicles, the intended recipient of the batteries in both cases, but
See Toyota Case, supra note 54 (contending that the relevant product market was only NiMH batteries.
MOFCOM conceded theoretically that the NiMH batteries could be further divided into vehicle batteries and
ordinary batteries, or into hybrid electric vehicles (HEV) and battery electric vehicles (BEV). However, in practice,
MOFCOM considered NiMH batteries mainly used in HEV).

58

See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Order Sets Conditions for Panasonic's Acquisition of Sanyo (Nov.
24,
2009),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2009/11/ftc-order-sets-conditions-panasonicsacquisition-sanyo [https://perma.cc/39YP-F9XS] [hereinafter FTC's Panasonic Case].
59

60

Id.

See Press Releases, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Approves Final Consent Order in Matter of Panasonic
Corporation/Sanyo Electric Co., Ltd.; FTC Approves Final Consent Order in Matter of Service Corporation
International and Palm Mortuary, Inc. (Jan. 8, 2010), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2010/01/ftcapproves-final-consent-order-matter-panasonic [https://perma.cc/H5DP-T9YA].

61

62

See FTC's Panasonic Case, supra note 58.

63

See Panasonic Case, supra note 55.

See Jingji Guancha Wang (经济观察网) [Economic Observe Web], Shangwubu Chushou Fanlongduan Shiya
Fengtian Hundong Fengbi Gongyinglian (商务部出手反垄断 施压丰田混动封闭供应链) [MOFCOM Raised
Anti-Monopoly Concerns to Pressure Toyota to Open Its Supply Chain for HEV], EEO (July 11, 2014),
http://www.eeo.com.cn/2014/0711/263211.shtml
[https://perma.cc/X4V7-U5UG]
(China)
[hereinafter
07/11/2014 News].
64

See Dianchi Zhongguo Wang (电池中国网) [China Battery Enterprise Alliance], Hundongche De Dianchi
Youshenme Qubie (混动车的电池有什么区别？)[What is the Difference Between HEV Batteries?], CBEA
(Nov. 29, 2018), http://www.cbea.com/xnyqc/201811/554331.html [https://perma.cc/3RVL-RZEN] (China).
65
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rather in electric vehicles. 66 However, MOFCOM had defined the geographic market to contain
only NiMH batteries. This scope excluded the Li-ion battery market, effectively diminishing
its potential anti-competitive effects. This "abnormally concentrated" market structure forced
MOFCOM to issue remedies, that consequently benefited the domestic NiMH battery industry.
The policies represented by MOFCOM's remedies in both Toyota and Panasonic, are thus at
odds with China's industrial policies regarding the application of Li-ion batteries to vehicles.
The fact that its remedies were opposed to Chinese state interests shows that MOFCOM
(the State) was not single-handedly controlling the decision-making mechanism in either case.
If MOFCOM had been actively putting aside economic policies and promoting political ones,
the policies would not have so conflicted with China's state interests. Therefore, we must
conclude that MOFCOM, as a governmental agency, was not the sole decision-maker in these
cases.
Nor did MOFCOM interfere with Toyota's business operations, as evidenced by the
behavioral remedies in Toyota. Toyota, in fact, as the principal purchaser of the NiMH HEV
batteries being manufactured by Corun PEVE, held 50% ownership in the joint venture. 67
MOFCOM ordered Corun PEVE to supply the batteries subject to the "Fair, Reasonable, and
Non-Discriminatory" (FRAND) commitment. Although the commitment appeared to lower the
product prices it could charge, Toyota would not suffer economic loss since Toyota is both a
major shareholder of Corun PEVE and a major purchaser of its products. Besides, MOFCOM
only required the joint venture to launch production within three years if the market had
sufficient demand. MOFCOM could not harm Toyota by only ordering an earlier supply to
downstream manufacturers, including Toyota Sinogy. These remedies contain only general
requirements with no apparent burden on the merger parties. These remedies show that, in both
Toyota and Panasonic, MOFCOM did not intend to limit foreign companies' business
operations since both cases were subject to the identical industrial, noneconomic policy.
On the contrary, the common stakeholder in both cases, Corun, was the primary remedy
beneficiary in the Panasonic case. As a major stakeholder in both cases, Corun had the potential
to be a de facto decision maker if it also became the remedy beneficiary in both cases. Corun
was the third-partyPNiMHC￼K,J.BC,CCT' 68￼T,Corun directly benefited by the structural
remedy in Panasonic.
The major stakeholder, Corun, as a merger party in the Toyota case, also explains the
remedies in this case involving FRAND commitments. In the long run, Corun received
significant indirect benefits from Toyota's FRAND obligations. As one of Corun's directors
See Qiche Chanye Touzi Guanli Guiding Zhengqiu Yijian Gao (《汽车产业投资管理规定》) [Provisions on
the
Administration
of
Investments
in
the
Automotive
Industry],
https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xxgk/zcfb/fzggwl/201812/W020190905495164515512.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CF4J9ACH] (China); see also Qiongyan Caijing (穹眼财经) [Qiongyan Finance and Economics], Zhongguo Qiche
Chanye Zhengce Fengxiang Yibian PHEV Mianlin Bei Ti (中国汽车产业政策风向已变，PHEV面临被"踢")
[China's Auto Industry Policy has Changed, and PHEV has been "kicked off" ] (May 31, 2018),
https://www.d1ev.com/news/shichang/69413 [https://perma.cc/9FDR-PCSF] (China);
see also Dianchi
Zhongguo Wang (电池中国网) [China Battery Enterprise Alliance], Lidaixin Zhongguo Diandong Qiche Chanye
Zhengce Shuli (李岱昕：中国电动汽车产业政策梳理) [Ms. Li Daixin: China's Electric Vehicle Industry Policy
Review], CBEA (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.cbea.com/ztxnyqcjdxw/201411/16545.html [https://perma.cc/2SDGX3BR] (China).
67
See Toyota Case, supra note 54 (The share ratios of Corun, Toyota China, PEVE, Sinogy, and Toyota Tsusho
are 40%, 5%, 41%, 10%, and 4%. Toyota itself owns 80.5% of the PEVE's shares).

66

68

See 07/11/2014 News, supra note 63.
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explained when MOFCOM required Corun PEVE to sell batteries to third parties on FRAND
terms, Corun's stake returns, as well as the sale of Corun's battery pole pieces, increased. 69
Otherwise, Corun PEVE would have likely become a mere supply factory for Toyota, allowing
Toyota to control all business orders and revenues. Corun apparently had the incentive to lobby
MOFCOM to issue a remedy involving FRAND obligations in order to promote a favorable
political policy for Corun.
To acknowledge Corun as a decision maker further explains the behavioral remedy in
Toyota of ordering the joint venture to start operation within three years. Mass production of
high-quality batteries requires a large amount of cooperation between Toyota and Corun. For
Corun, this remedy could be leveraged to indirectly force Toyota to share its know-how and
related technology with Corun. MOFCOM's remedy regarding the opening of a Corun PEVE
factory further advanced Corun's competitiveness with its domestic competitors, such as
Chunlan and BYD.
The fact that Corun shared its vision of the market with MOFCOM in MOFCOM's merger
reviews indicates Corun was the policy source leading to this distinctive product market.
According to China's news sources, Corun had considered that the product market should
exclude Lithium-ion batteries. 70 The chairperson of the board of Corun had directed the
company to develop the HEV battery industry for years before both mergers. 71 In addition,
although China had not been subsidizing the HEV industry since 2013, Corun still bet that the
relevant national industry strategy would refocus on hybrid power. 72 For Corun, the scope of a
limited product market would stimulate MOFCOM to issue remedies indirectly favoring
Corun's future development plan. Considering the fact that Corun was the only major
stakeholder appearing in both cases, Corun not only benefited from, but also generated the
noneconomic, political remedies in both cases. MOFCOM, thus, did not work as a sole decision
maker dominating policy consideration in these merger reviews, but rather shared its decision
making with Corun.
C. FOREIGN STAKEHOLDER AS DECISION- MAKER: SEAGATE AND WESTERN DIGITAL
The 2011 cases, Seagate and Samsung (Seagate), and the 2012 cases, Western Digital and
Viviti (Western Digital), demonstrate that foreign stakeholders can also dominate political

69

Id.

See Zhongguo Chuneng Wang Xinwen Zhongxin (中国储能网新闻中心) [ESCN News Center], Keliyuan
Jiannan De Nieqing Dianchi Meng (科力远：艰难的镍氢“电池梦”) [Corun: a stressful dream of nickel-metal
hydride
battery],
ESCN
(Nov.
11,
2013),
http://www.escn.com.cn/news/show-85137.html
[https://perma.cc/NT87-VR2Z] (China)(Corun confirmed that, within two decades, the market would still belong
to NiMH HEV batteries).
71
Id.
70

See Zhongguo Qiche Bao (中国汽车报) [China Automotive News], Jili Bu Jiepan Yiwei Lizhi Yuangong
Daochu Keliyuan Jukui Neimu (吉利不接盘?一位离职员工道出科力远巨亏内幕) [Geely Will Not Bet On? A
Former Employee Says Stories Behind Corun's Huge Deficit], Cheyun (Apr. 12, 2017),
http://www.cheyun.com/content/15770 [https://perma.cc/WRJ8-Q6W3] (China).
72
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policies in MOFCOM's merger reviews. 73 In the previous two cases, although the major
stakeholder, Corun, was a leading Chinese domestic company in the HEV battery market,
agency stakeholder domination in MOFCOM's decision-making mechanism was not limited to
domestic companies. The Seagate and Western Digital cases illustrate that MOFCOM could in
fact share its review authority with foreign stakeholders. The identical review contents indicate
that MOFCOM reviewed both of these mergers simultaneously. 74 Here, the merger party,
Seagate, significantly influenced MOFCOM's understanding of the Hard-Drive Disk (HDD)
product market. Also, the behavioral remedies in both decisions primarily benefited the merger
parties, reflecting political policies generated from the major stakeholder instead of from
MOFCOM.
From MOFCOM's perspective, the HDD market was a highly concentrated oligopoly,
requiring further remedies to reduce its anticompetitive effects. Before the merger, there were
only five HDD manufacturers in the world: Seagate, Western Digital, Hitachi (Viviti), Toshiba,
and Samsung. In 2011-2012, Seagate merged with the HDD business of Samsung. At almost
the same time, Western Digital acquired Viviti's HDD and Solid-State Drives business.
MOFCOM determined that the premerger Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) was 2454;
whereas the postmerger HHI grew to 4158, due in large part to the postmerger HHI increase in
Seagate of 660, and in Western Digital of 1044. 75 Because of the significant growth of
concentration level after the mergers, MOFCOM prepared remedies to reduce the potentially
anticompetitive effects of the mergers.
MOFCOM's hold separate remedies, in fact, present structural remedy characteristics. 76
In both cases, MOFCOM required Seagate, Western Digital, Viviti, and Samsung to
manufacture HDDs still using their old brand names after the merger. In addition, they were to
set up firewalls of essential competitive information in order to maintain independent
production, pricing, and sales. MOFCOM's hold separate remedies forced the merger parties
to make independent business judgments for a time even after the merger. Thus, the only
See Shangwubu Gonggao 2011 Nian Di 90 Hao Guanyu Futiaojian Pizhun Cijie Keji Gongsi Shougou Sanxing
Dianzi Youxian Gongsi Yingpan Qudongqi Yewu Fanlongduan Shencha Jueding De Gonggao
(商务部公告2011年第90号
关于附条件批准希捷科技公司收购三星电子有限公司硬盘驱动器业务反垄断审查决定的公告)
[Announcement No. 90 [2011] of the Ministry of Commerce- Announcement on the Decision from AntiMonopoly Review of the Concentration of Undertakings on Conditional Approval in the Acquisition of the Hard
Disk Drive Business of Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. by Seagate Technology Plc.] (issued by MOFCOM, Dec.
12, 2011, effective the same day), http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/201112/20111207874274.shtml
[https://perma.cc/DQQ3-7R6Z] (China) [hereinafter Seagate Case]. See also Shangwubu Gonggao 2012 Nian Di
9 Hao Guanyu Fujia Xianzhixing Tiaojian Pizhun Xibu Shuju Shougou Rili Cunchu Jingyingzhe Jizhong
Fanlongduan_Shencha_Jueding_De_Gonggao_(商务部公告2012年第9号
关于附加限制性条件批准西部数据收购日立存储经营者集中反垄断审查决定的公告) [Announcement No.
9 [2011] of the Ministry of Commerce] - Announcement on the Decision from Anti-Monopoly Review of the
Concentration of Undertakings on Conditional Approval of Viviti Technologies Ltd. by Western Digital Corp.]
(issued
by
MOFCOM,
Mar.
2,
2012,
effective
the
same
day),
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/201203/20120307993758.shtml [https://perma.cc/CJX6-LXKE] (China).
[hereinafter Western Digital Case].
74
See Seagate Case, supra note 72; see also Western Digital Case, supra note 72.
73

See Seagate Case, supra note 72; see also Western Digital Case, supra note 72 (stating that in 2010, the global
market shares of these five manufacturers were about 33%, 29%, 18%, 10%, and 10%, respectively).

75

See Shaoping Chen, Merger Control Under China's Anti-Monopoly Law, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INT'L & COMPAR. L.
177, 198-99 (2013); see also Foster, supra note 1 at 81; see also Jim O'Connell, Rabbit, Revisited-Antitrust
Enforcement in China, ANTITRUST, Spring 2014, at 6, 7.
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significant difference between MOFCOM's hold separate remedies and structural remedies was
the limited duration of the remedy effects. Compared to the permanent effects of structural
remedies, MOFCOM's hold separate remedies only temporarily intervened in the parties'
business operations in the HDD market.
MOFCOM's hold separate remedies are notably distinguishable from the ones of the West.
The US and the EU occasionally prepare temporary hold separate remedies before divestitures
to third parties. These temporary hold separate remedies support primary structural remedies
premerger when the merger parties need a period of time to locate a proper acquirer or to
transfer a divested asset. By contrast, MOFCOM's hold separate remedies require merger
parties to maintain separate assets or business operations for a few years after the mergers,
instead of a few months before divestiture. 77
Seagate further pointed out that "the distinction of HDDs on the basis of the end-use (for
example, Desktops, Mobile PCs, and tablets) [was] increasingly blurred" because HDDs that
are sold for different end-uses are now technically the same. 78 MOFCOM's understanding of
the product market was similar to that of Seagate.
MOFCOM's extensive product market determination of HDDs ultimately benefited
Seagate. Generally, the permanent divestiture of certain businesses or assets will significantly
decrease their portfolio value. 79 Seagate was thus intentionally unifying the different HDDs
into one market to avoid divestiture. Seagate therefore refused the demand for substitutability
in order to define one large HDD market. Usually, a potential third-party purchaser is a minor
competitor who understands the industry under concern. If mergers develop into various submarkets, review agencies can easily reduce the anti-competitive effects of certain sub-markets,
while maintaining the efficiency of mergers in other sub-markets. By contrast, if MOFCOM
had taken Seagate's position in this case, MOFCOM could not have divested such a large
package containing Samsung's all HDD business, especially considering the fact that two other
main competitors were also required to get clearance of their mergers simultaneously.
Therefore, beyond the supplier's view of the technical similarities between HDD products with
different end-users, Seagate's understanding of the product market reflects its interest in
preventing the review agency from issuing a structural remedy. The potential divested packages
might become too large to find a qualified purchaser to restore the competition level. 80
Insufficient market information was the fundamental reason for MOFCOM’s issuance of
hold-separate remedies. In these merger reviews, MOFCOM, unlike its Western counterparts,
often lacked sufficient market information to sub-divide a product market any further.
MOFCOM did not have adequate resources to analyze the product market independently, so it
would rely on documents that merger parties submitted without fully understanding their
reliability or possible bias.
However, although it remained passive in certain circumstances, MOFCOM still tried to
reduce the anti-competitive effects of mergers by framing selective behavioral remedies.
Although behavioral remedies usually require costly supervision ex-post, the permanent effects
77

See Foster, supra note 1 at 81.

The EC published a 126 page Commissn Decision. It contains much first-hand information, including not only
the EC's analyses, but also arguments and defenses of the merger parties. See Commission Decision 139/2004, art.
8(declaring a concentration to be compatible with the internal market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement)
78

Merger parties always try to avoid the permanent effects of such harsh remedies. In a highly concentrated
oligopoly, such divestiture will inevitably enhance the competitor's market power in certain sub-markets.
79

80

See HUANG & DENG, supra note 30, at 44.

VOL. 18.1

SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS

18

of improper structural remedies on the markets and consumers often outweigh the temporary
supervision costs. These temporary behavioral hold-separate remedies gave MOFCOM
authority to regulate, modify, or withdraw inappropriate remedies even after the reviews rather
than allowing its remedies to cause permanent defects.
In sum, MOFCOM was the policy source of the economic policies in those cases, while
Seagate was the source of the non-economic policies. MOFCOM's merger reviews,
demonstrating an agency-stakeholder domination instead of a singular review-agency
domination, here stemmed from MOFCOM's lack of adequate resources to verify information
independently. In both sets of cases, the major stakeholders and decision-makers, such as
Corun and Seagate, indirectly influenced MOFCOM's merger reviews instead of
directly tossing their preferred remedies into the contests.
Additionally, the shared equivalent weight of economic and non-economic (political)
policies in MOFCOM's remedies reveals that MOFCOM and the major stakeholders remained
balanced in an agency-stakeholder domination. A single remedy generally favors only one
policy source, and the importance of the remedy reflects its priority among decision-makers.
However, in both sets of decisions above, a single MOFCOM remedy represented MOFCOM's
economic policy plus stakeholders' political policies simultaneously. There was no apparent
competition policy preference in any of these cases. Thus, the equivalent weight of MOFCOM's
economic policies and the stakeholders' political policies reflect the balancing relationships
among decision-makers in agency-stakeholder domination.
IV.

SAMR’S DECISION- MAKING MECHANISM

China's decision-making mechanism of merger reviews demonstrates new
characteristics because SAMR replaced MOFCOM to become the new review agency. Using
new technology, SAMR now develops laws, procedures, and practices for merger reviews with
dramatic speed. 81 Compared to MOFCOM, SAMR more frequently invites independent
consultants to complete empirical studies. Meanwhile, the current trade war between the US
and China has also significantly influenced SAMR's merger review remedies in response to
fluctuating policy in the US. By July 2020, SAMR had completed ten merger reviews. 82 SAMR
shows protectionism in frequently ordering merger parties to continue supplying essential
products on fair terms to China. These facts strongly indicate that SAMR, more than
MOFCOM, actively seeks to apply both economic and political (non-economic) policies,
reflecting the Chinese government. Meanwhile, because the merger review officials working
for MOFCOM all transferred to SAMR, 83 SAMR has largely maintained MOFCOM's
decision-making mechanism, and major stakeholders may still influence merger reviews far
For instance, SAMR has recently updated Guidelines on Declaration of Mergers Between Undertakings and
formulated Interim Provisions on Examination of Concentration of Business Operators. See Guanyu Jingyingzhe
Jizhong Shenbao de Zhidao Yijian (关于经营集中申报的指导意见) [Guiding Opinions of the State
Administration for Market Regulation on the Declaration of Mergers Between Undertakings] (promulgated by
State Administration for Market Regulation, Sept. 29, 2018, eff. Sept. 29, 2018),
http://gkml.samr.gov.cn/nsjg/fldj/201907/t20190726_305197.html [https://perma.cc/ZVU5-ZFFZ] (China); see
also
Jingyingzhe
Jizhong
Shencha
Zanxing
Guiding
Zhengqiu
Yijian
Gao
(经营者集中审查暂行规定（征求意见稿) [Interim Provisions on Merger Rev. Between Undertakings (a draft
for the invitation of recommendation)] (promulgated by State Administration for Market Regulation, Jan. 7, 2020),
http://www.moj.gov.cn/news/content/2020-01/07/zlk_3239243.html [https://perma.cc/X7PL-PD73] (China).
82
See Notice and Announcement, State Administration for Market Regulation, Conditionally Approved/
Prohibited Mergers, http://www.samr.gov.cn/fldj/tzgg/ftjpz/ [https://perma.cc/H8WM-BAGX] (China).
81

83

See DENG & HUANG, supra note 2, at 18.
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beyond their limited role in the West as "information source." However, combined with the
fact that SAMR has been enhancing its domination in the merger reviews, China's merger
reviews thus present a new type of agency-stakeholder relationship in the SAMR era.
A. SAMR BEGINS TO DOMINATE ITS MERGER REVIEWS
In its first two years, SAMR has significantly increased agency dominance of merger
reviews from two perspectives: enhancing information collection and analytical capacity. With
the greater technological capacity for collecting information and analyzing it, the merger
review agency is better able to screen and restrict major stakeholders from too much
influencing of SAMR's merger reviews. Furthermore, as long as tension continues between the
US and China, SAMR is compelled to protect the interests of domestic companies and
industries. Therefore, SAMR has already become a more powerful agency to represent Chinese
government interests than MOFCOM was in China's merger reviews.
A. SAMR CONSIDERS ECONOMIC POLICIES MORE FREQUENTLY
Since its 2018 inception, SAMR has greatly enhanced the agency's ability to collect
marketing information. Compared to MOFCOM, SAMR uses more sophisticated tools for
collecting information. For example, SAMR may send questionnaires (2019 II-VI/Finisar case,
2019 Novelis/Aleris case); 84 invite independent experts (2019 Garden/DSM case, 2020
Danaher/GE Biopharma case); 85 complete field research (Novelis); or hold one or even a series
of symposiums (Novelis and Garden). Thus, SAMR promotes its dominance while actually
84
See Shichang Jianguan Zongju Guanyu Fujian Xianzhixing Tiaojian Pizhun Gaoyi Gufen Youxian Gongsi
Shougou Feinisa Gufen Youxian Gongsi Guquan'an Fanlongduan Shencha Jueding De Gonggao,
(市场监管总局关于附加限制性条件批准高意股份有限公司收购菲尼萨股份有限公司股权案反垄断审查决
定的公告) [Announcement of the State Administration for Market Supervision on the Anti-Monopoly review
Decision on Approving the Case of Gaoyi Co., Ltd’s Acquisition of Equity in Finisar Co., LTd. With Additional
Restrictive
Conditions](Release
date
Sept.
23,
2019,
eff.
Sept.
23,
2019),
(
http://www.samr.gov.cn/fldj/tzgg/ftjpz/201909/t20190920_306948.html [https://perma.cc/6RPU-8VSL] (China)
[hereinafter II-VI Case]; see also Shichang Jianguan Zongju Guanyu Fujian Xianzhixing Tiaojian Pizhun
Nuobeilisi Gongsi Shougou Aili Gongsi Guquan'an Fanlongduan Shencha Jueding De Gonggao
(市场监管总局关于附加限制性条件批准诺贝丽斯公司收购爱励公司股权案反垄断审查决定的公告)
[Announcement of the State Administration for Market Regulation on the Anti-Monopoly review Decision on
Approving Novelis’ Acquisition of Aleris Equity with Additional Restrictive Conditions] (Release time: 2019-1220 16:07, effective the same day), http://www.samr.gov.cn/fldj/tzgg/ftjpz/201912/t20191220_309365.html
[https://perma.cc/5D6S-5LYM] (China) [hereinafter Novelis Case].
85
See Shichang Jianguan Zongju Guanyu Fujian Xianzhixing Tiaojian Pizhun Zhejiang Huayuan Shengwu Gaoke
Gufen Youxian Gongsi Yu Huangjia Disiman Youxian Gongsi Xinshe Heying'an Fanlongduan Shencha Jueding
De
Gonggao
(市场监管总局关于附加限制性条件批准浙江花园生物高科股份有限公司与皇家帝斯曼有限公司新设合营
企业案反垄断审查决定的公告) [Announcement of the State Administration for Market Regulation on the
Decision to Approve the Antimonopoly Review of the New Joint Venture Between Zhejiang Garden Biotech Co.,
Ltd. and Royal DSM Co., Ltd. with Additional Restrictive Conditions] (Release date Oct. 18, 2019, eff. Oct. 18,
2019), http://www.samr.gov.cn/fldj/tzgg/ftjpz/201910/t20191018_307455.html [https://perma.cc/85X3-XSAY]
(China); see also Shichang Jianguan Zongju Guanyu Fujian Xianzhixing Tiaojian Pizhun Dannahe Gongsi
Shougou Tongyong Dianqi Yiliao Shengming Kexue Shengwu Zhiyao Yewu'an Fanlongduan Shencha Jueding
De
Gonggao
(市场监管总局关于附加限制性条件批准丹纳赫公司收购通用电气医疗生命科学生物制药业务案反垄断审
查决定的公告) [Announcement of the State Administration for Market Regulation on the Anti-monopoly Review
Decision on Approving Danaher’s Acquisition of General Electric’s Medical Life Sciences Biopharmaceutical
Business with Additional Restrictive Conditions] (Release date Feb. 28, 2020, eff. Feb. 28, 2020),
http://www.samr.gov.cn/fldj/tzgg/ftjpz/202002/t20200228_312297.html [https://perma.cc/H3U7-CK6P] (China)
[hereinafter Danaher Case].
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collecting market information.
With its more detailed market information, SAMR can understand the relevant market
more precisely than MOFCOM ever did. For example, in the 2018 Essilor and Luxottica
(Essilor) case, Essilor and Luxottica were competing in the Chinese optical lens, frames, and
sunglasses market. SAMR used a survey on the brand recognition of Essilor and Luxottica
from both retailer and consumer perspectives. 86 By analyzing consumer habits and alternative
brands in sixty thousand Chinese retail stores, SAMR learned that the Chinese glasses retail
market is highly fragmented, which means that geographic markets should be divided at the
city level. In the past, MOFCOM, at most, divided the geographic market at either the global
or the domestic level. Therefore, SAMR's more detailed knowledge of a geographic market
enabled the merger agency to better comprehend market structure than did MOFCOM.
Further, SAMR has developed its analytical capacity to predict the potential effects of
mergers. China's merger reviews now analyze concentration levels to determine whether the
mergers are likely to cause anti-competitive effects. Based on its imprecise understanding of
market structure, MOFCOM's merger reviews often roughly calculated the concentration ratio
and the HHI in attempting to anticipate the potential effects of mergers. By contrast, SAMR's
merger reviews are adopting advanced techniques to anticipate market response and price
alterations. Such improvement is effective from many perspectives, as a study of SAMR's
decisions to date show. For instance, SAMR invites third-party consultancies to do economics
analyses (Essilor, II-VI, Danaher, 2020 Nvidia/Mellanox, ZF), accounting for 50% of SAMR's
merger reviews. 87
The ZF case is an excellent example of economics analysis improvement. 88 In ZF,
SAMR completed a quantitative analysis of whether the merger parties can benefit from supply
reduction through an independent consultancy. According to SAMR's merger review, there is
a real risk that the merger parties might block essential input of the AMT controller in China
since the merger parties only need to sacrifice 15%-20% supply to earn extra benefits; however,
such proportion must be increased to 25%-30% in the global market. Thus, it was important
for SAMR to further evaluate the domestic markets' effects even if the agency had defined the
geographic market as global. Because the merger parties had a vertical relationship in upstream
AMT controller and downstream AMT markets, SAMR adopted behavioral remedies,
especially "defensive" ones, reflecting economic policies.
B. CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE SAMR

TO

CONSIDER POLITICAL POLICIES MORE

See Shichang Jianguan Zongju Guanyu Fujian Xianzhixing Tiaojian Pizhun Yishilu Guoji Yu Luxuntika Jituan
Hebing'an
Fanlongduan
Shencha
Jueding
De
Gonggao
(市场监管总局关于附加限制性条件批准依视路国际与陆逊梯卡集团合并案反垄断审查决定的公告)
[Announcement of the State Administration of Market Supervision on the Decision to Approve the Anti-monopoly
Review of the Merger of Essilor International and Luxottica Group with Additional Restrictive Conditions]
(Release
date
Jul.
25,
2018,
eff.
Jul.
25,
2018),http://www.samr.gov.cn/fldj/tzgg/ftjpz/202003/t20200309_312682.html [https://perma.cc/E5BR-6C78] (China).
87
Id.; see also II-VI Case, supra note 83; see also Danaher Case, supra note 84; see also Novelis Case, supra note
83; see also Shichang Jianguan Zongju Guanyu Fujian Xianzhixing Tiaojian Pizhun Caiaifu Gufen Gongsi
Shougou Weiboke Konggu Gongsi Guquan'an Fanlongduan Shencha Jueding De Gonggao
(市场监管总局关于附加限制性条件批准采埃孚股份公司收购威伯科控股公司股权案反垄断审查决定的公
告) [Announcement of the State Administration for Market Regulation on the Anti-Monopoly Review Decision
on Approving ZF’s Acquisition of Equity in WABCO Holding company with Additional Restrictive Conditions]
(Release date May 15, 2020), http://www.samr.gov.cn/fldj/tzgg/ftjpz/202005/t20200515_315255.html
[https://perma.cc/5DZ5-2ZU3] (China) [hereinafter ZF Case].
88
See ZF Case, supra note 86.
86
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CONSISTENTLY
SAMR's new domination may also firmly promote political policies instead of exclusively
economic ones. Despite its significantly improved merger review capacities, SAMR has issued
structural remedies in only two cases so far, the Novelis case and the Danaher case. 89 One
reason for SAMR's frequent promotion of political policies in its merger reviews is the trade
war between the US and China. Evidence of this is seen in the fact that the review periods of
SAMR's merger reviews have fluctuated in direct correlation with the severity of the tension
between the two countries. At times of heightened global tension, SAMR intentionally
strengthens protection of its domestic key industries and domestic customers.
SAMR's merger reviews often take six to eighteen months. From the perspective of
merger parties, SAMR's merger reviews may take even longer. 90 The time needed for the
following merger parties to get clearance is listed in chronological order as follows: 428 days
(Essilor), 291 days (KLA-Tencor), 392 days (Cargotec), 268 days (II-VI), 414 days (Novelis),
554 days (Garden), 305 days (Danaher), 244 days (Infineon), 358 days (Nvidia), and 263 days
(ZF). 91
SAMR's delays are clearly related to the tension at the time of this writing between the
US and China. When the Trump Administration approved additional tariffs on Chinese
products in March 2018, the average time to review a merger was 384 days (KLA-Tencor,
Cargotec, II-VI, Novelis, Garden). In January 2020, after the US and China signed the

89

See also Novelis Case, supra note 83; see also Danaher Case, supra note 84.

China's merger reviews are known for delays. Similar to MOFCOM, SAMR usually needs a few days to a month
to initiate Phase I reviews. If SAMR requires an extended review period, merger parties must withdraw and refile
the notifications. The days of SAMR required to review in chronological order are: 318 days (Essilor), 230 days
(KLA-Tencor), 348 days (Cargotec), 209 days (II-VI), 400 days (Novelis), 346 days (Garden), 237 days (Danaher),
182 days (Infineon), 242 days (Nvidia), and 172 days (ZF).
90

See Shichang Jianguan Zongju Guanyu Fujian Xianzhixing Tiaojian Pizhun Ketian Gongsi Shougou Aobao Keji
Youxian
Gongsi
Guquan'an
Fanlongduan
Shencha
Jueding
De
Gonggao
(市场监管总局关于附加限制性条件批准科天公司收购奥宝科技有限公司股权案反垄断审查决定的公告)
[Announcement of the State Administration for Market Regulation — Announcement on the Decision from AntiMonopoly Review of the Concentration of Undertakings on Conditional Approval of Orbotech Ltd. by KLATencor
Corp.]
(issued
by
SAMR,
Feb.
13,
2019,
eff.
Feb.
13,
2019),
http://gkml.samr.gov.cn/nsjg/xwxcs/201902/t20190220_290940.html [https://perma.cc/VLT6-X7P7] (China)
[hereinafter KLA-Tencor Case]; see also Shichang Jianguan Zongju Guanyu Fujian Xianzhixing Tiaojian Pizhun
Kagekete Jituan Shougou Derisi Jituan Bufen Yewu'an Fanlongduan Shencha Jueding De Gonggao
(市场监管总局关于附加限制性条件批准卡哥特科集团收购德瑞斯集团部分业务案反垄断审查决定的公告
) [Announcement of the State Administration for Market Regulation —Announcement on the Decision from AntiMonopoly Review of the Concentration of Undertakings on Conditional Approval of TTS Group by Cargotec Oyj]
(issued
by
SAMR,
Jul.
12,
2019,
eff.
Jul.
12,
2019),
http://www.samr.gov.cn/fldj/tzgg/ftjpz/201907/t20190712_303428.html [https://perma.cc/D7E5-D7QB] (China)
[hereinafter Cargotec Case]; see also Shichang Jianguan Zongju Guanyu Fujian Xianzhixing Tiaojian Pizhun
Yingfeiling Keji Gongsi Shougou Saipulasi Bandaoti Gongsi Guquan'an Fanlongduan Shencha Jueding De
Gonggao
(市场监管总局关于附加限制性条件批准英飞凌科技公司收购赛普拉斯半导体公司股权案反垄断审查决定
的公告) [Announcement of the State Administration for Market Regulation —Announcement on the Decision
from Anti-Monopoly Review of the Concentration of Undertakings on Conditional Approval of Cypress
Semiconductor Corp. by Infineon Technologies AG] (issued by SAMR, Apr. 8, 2020, eff. Apr. 8, 2020),
http://www.samr.gov.cn/fldj/tzgg/ftjpz/202004/t20200408_313950.html [https://perma.cc/KHD6-FDCN] (China)
[hereinafter Infineon Case].
91
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Economic and Trade Agreement, 92 the average time for clearance was 296 days (Danaher,
Infineon, Nvidia, ZF). The variance of review periods demonstrates vital political
considerations in SAMR's merger reviews.
B. SAMR’S MERGER REVIEWS HAVE COMPETITION POLICIES WITH EQUIVALENT WEIGHT
In its dominance as decisionmaker, SAMR promotes both economic and political policies
equally. As SAMR begins to take control of the decision-making mechanism, the agency is
deliberately avoiding favoring of political policies. In other words, SAMR limits the
application of political policies to only those minimally necessary to protect economic security
rather than primarily pursuing business interests of Chinese companies. Thus, SAMR
consistently presents economic and non-economic (political) policies with equivalent weight.
In particular, the frequent application of "defensive" behavioral remedies is a convincing
example of competition policy equivalency because the remedies reflect both economic and
political considerations simultaneously without apparent policy preference.
"Defensive" behavioral remedies are widely adopted in China's merger reviews. 93
Compared to active behavioral remedies such as mandatory licensing of patents or trade
secrets, defensive remedies never actually require merger parties to change their traditional
business operations. The most common "defensive" behavioral remedy of SAMR's merger
reviews is the commitment to supply essential input to key industries to China after a merger.
SAMR has issued this type of behavioral remedy in six cases, counting for two-thirds of the
cases since the trade war with the US.
The commitment to supply essential inputs generally involves key industries for Chinese
economic security. The 2019 KLA-Tencor/Orbotech case, for example, affected the Chinese
semiconductor industry where SAMR required both parties to continue providing
semiconductor process control equipment and services to Chinese customers. 94 The Cargotec
case affected international transportation as SAMR required Cargotec to supply hatch
covers, roll-on equipment for merchant ships, and cargo lifters, and to avoid maliciously
delaying the supply. 95 The II-VI case, where SAMR ordered II-VI and Finisar to supply their
wavelength
selective
switch,
had
significant
influence
on
Chinese
96
optical communication device manufacturing. The Infineon case, involving the Chinese
automobile manufacturing industry, required Infineon and Cypress to continue supplying
vehicle level insulated gate bipolar transistor, vehicle level micro control unit, and vehicle level
NOR flash memory to the Chinese market. 97 The Nvidia case impacted Chinese
supercomputing and artificial intelligence markets because it required Nvidia to continue
supplying to Chinese industry its GPU accelerator and Mellanox's high-speed network

92
See Economic And Trade Agreement Between The Government Of The People's Republic Of China And The
Government
Of
The
United
States
Of
America,
Jan.
15,
2020,
http://wjb.mof.gov.cn/gongzuodongtai/202001/W020200116100509153339.pdf [https://perma.cc/VF8H-QGLD]
(China).

There have been multiple types of "defensive" behavioral remedies since MOFCOM's time. Those remedies
have mainly targeted unreasonable commercial terms in practice, such as bundling or tying or refusing to deal with
China.

93

94

See KLA-Tencor Case, supra note 90.

95

See Cargotec Case, supra note 90.

96

See II-VI Case, supra note 83.

97

See Infineon Case, supra note 90.
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interconnect products and services. 98 Finally, the ZF case influenced domestic product
transportation as SAMR ordered ZF and Wabco to continue providing to Chinese industry
AMT-controllers. 99 These cases are all related to essential industries in which China lacks
independent supply capacity.
Unlike the more active role of stakeholders in the decision-making mechanism under
MOFCOM, SAMR actually issues "defensive behavioral" remedies to restrain major
stakeholders from overinfluencing the decision-making mechanism. Although SAMR starts a
merger review controlling the decision-making mechanism, major stakeholders, perhaps
accustomed to a more active role, still try to lobby the agency or even share its merger review
authority. As seen in Part II, during MOFCOM's time, major stakeholders, such as competitors
or downstream manufacturers, at times co-decided the merger reviews. Though SAMR has
started to dominate the decision-making mechanism of merger reviews, it is problematic to
consider SAMR as completely dominating it. For instance, SAMR still lacks review officials
to establish reliable information collection channels or detailed merger review guidelines.
Thus, through official complaints or personal connections to the agency, major stakeholders
may continue to partially influence SAMR's merger reviews. In ZF, Shaanxi Fast, a domestic
competitor to ZF and a customer of Wabco, may be the most recent example.
In ZF, SAMR determined that the merger would harm both global and domestic AMT
markets, and so issued "defensive" behavioral remedies. The merger parties, ZF and Wabco,
are both world leaders in manufacturing large commercial vehicle components. ZF and Wabco
have a vertical relationship in AMT-controller and AMT markets. SAMR further defined the
geographic market as global because China imports most of its large commercial vehicle
components without an apparent barrier to entry. However, SAMR balanced the effects on both
global and domestic markets in reviewing this merger. Ultimately, SAMR ordered ZF and
Wabco to continue providing the AMT controller and its components to existing Chinese
customers. Additionally, SAMR stipulated that the merger parties must continue supplying
Chinese customers and help them to develop AMT controllers under the FRAND
commitments. 100
The West, on the other hand, did not consider the merger between ZF and Wabco as
harming global vehicle transmission system competition. In fact, the EC unconditionally
cleared the transaction, 101 while the DOJ required both parties to divest Wabco's North

98
See Shichang Jianguan Zongju Guanyu Fujian Xianzhixing Tiaojian Pizhun Yingweida Gongsi Shougou
Mailuosi Keji Youxian Gongsi Guquan'an Fanlongduan Shencha Jueding De Gonggao
(市场监管总局关于附加限制性条件批准英伟达公司收购迈络思科技有限公司股权案反垄断审查决定的公
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American steering components and related assets and businesses. 102 The West reasoned that
the merger would not otherwise harm competition because there are alternative manufacturers
available at both levels of the transmission system market. 103 Since SAMR also contended that
the relevant companies were competing in a global market, different jurisdictions should have
similar understandings about market structure if only considering economic policies.
SAMR's decision in ZF indicates that the merger review protected the interests of
domestic AMT manufacturers. The ZF case was reviewed from the perspective of AMT
manufacturers. For instance, SAMR argued that downstream AMT manufacturers are usually
challenged to find an alternative supply from Wabco because of user viscosity. Downstream
manufacturers need four to five years to design and test an AMT in cooperation with an AMT
controller manufacturer. They must sign a four to five year supply agreement for the
customized AMT controllers until the AMT controller is off the market. Therefore, SAMR
issued behavioral remedies to continue the supply because AMT manufacturers have difficulty
switching to other suppliers in a short time. 104
Shaanxi Fast, a domestic competitor to ZF and a customer of Wabco, may have influenced
the decision-making mechanism as a third-party. Shaanxi Fast was not only the leading
competitor of ZF in China, but also had strategic cooperation with Wabco. In China, few
manufacturers have a developing strategy for designing the AMT controller and producing
AMT. Wabco thus entered into a long-term supply contract for its OptiDrive system with
Shaanxi Fast in 2011. 105 Shaanxi Fast had also signed an agreement with Wabco to develop
AMT technologies collaboratively in 2016. 106 The development of Shaanxi Fast depended on
Wabco's continuous supply of the AMT controller and the success of the technical cooperation.
As the primary user of the AMT controller, Shaanxi Fast may be the only party directly
benefiting from SAMR's behavioral remedies in the ZF case. There is another fact
demonstrating Shaanxi Fast most likely intervened in SAMR's merger review: China's merger
reviews generally consider the effect of a merger on domestic industries and companies, but
rarely analyze the effect on an individual company. In this case, however, SAMR evaluated
the influence of a merger on Shaanxi Fast. 107
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